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Myanmar is a developing country with significant humanitarian needs. It is therefore
a country for which achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) should be
a high priority. While exact data are difficult to obtain, Myanmar is performing poorly
across most of the MDG targets. This is partly an unintended but direct consequence of
the international sanctions and concomitant reduced aid flows into Myanmar. Myanmar
receives the lowest level of aid per person of any of the 50 Least Developed Countries,
raising the very direct question of whether the MDGs are relevant or achievable in
Myanmar. Failure to achieve the MDGs could have serious implications in 2015 on
future international funding and on reform programmes in the country. This paper
considers how the political goals of the international community negatively impact
upon the ability to achieve the MDGs and proposes a way forward by increasing aid
and by tailoring the MDGs to the Myanmar context, as several regional neighbours have
done.
Keywords: Myanmar; MDGs; sanctions; targeting goals
JEL classifications: O19, O53
1. Introduction
Myanmar (Burma)1 is a developing nation with significant humanitarian need and a con-
siderable portion of its population living in extreme poverty. It is therefore a country for
which achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) might be expected to be a
high priority. However, international concerns over military rule, governance and human
rights have resulted in severely restricted humanitarian assistance and many countries in-
stituting sanctions to apply pressure for democratisation. While exact data are difficult to
obtain, Myanmar is performing poorly across most of the MDG targets. This is partly an
unintended but direct consequence of the international sanctions and their concomitant
restricted humanitarian assistance against Myanmar.
This paper argues that the international community has conflicting agendas regarding
Myanmar: one being poverty alleviation and development; the other being political change
in the belief that democratisation is a pre-requisite to sustainable development. Ideally, both
outcomes should be achieved, but of these two agendas, the latter is the dominant view. The
result is that the international community is prepared to restrict economic development and
humanitarian aid if necessary to push for significant political change.
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Without a way being found to progress development goals within the context of the
current political standoff, it is likely that many of the MDG targets will not be achieved
in Myanmar. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon recently noted that failing to meet the
MDGs ‘would multiply the dangers of our world’ (UN 2010, p. 3), and others have noted
the probable implications of states being labelled as having failed to meet the MDGs (e.g.
Clemens et al. 2007). This paper argues thatMyanmar’s not achieving theMDGswould have
serious implications in 2015 on future international funding and on reform programmes
in the country. This is an outcome which must be avoided. This paper therefore seeks to
explore the way forward, particularly proposing the need for increased humanitarian aid
and tailored MDGs in Myanmar.
This paper is composed of five sections. The first section has introduced the issue. The
second section will consider the humanitarian context in Myanmar and current progress
towards meeting the MDGs. The third section will develop the argument that the interna-
tional community has conflicting approaches towards Myanmar and will explore blockages
and requisites to greater achievement of the MDGs, which include more aid and improved
governance. The fourth section will propose a more robust way forward, involving the tai-
loring of the MDGs to the local context. This is not necessarily about disbanding sanctions,
but about the agreed tailoring of goals. The final section will offer some conclusions.
2. MDG progress and humanitarian context
2.1. Reliability of data
Accurate statistical data for Myanmar are lacking, and what is available is of questionable
validity. This is the result of several factors, including the government having limited
control over parts of the territory, limited resources for data gathering and analysis and
data being manipulated for internal and external consumption (Steinberg 2006, p. xxvi).
The government has not published a full annual statistical review since 1997–1998, and
the most recent formal census took place in 1983. As an illustration of the crisis in reliable
data, Table 1 provides population estimates from various agencies showing variation of up
to 16 million people over four years (a variation of up to one third the estimated population)
depending on the source and on the modelling used.
This lack of reliable data and difficulties in gaining access mean that researchers are
often forced to rely on ‘informed hunches’ (Taylor 2008, p. 219). Data are ‘negotiated
more than they are observed in Myanmar’ and political incentives favour over-reporting by
government officials (Dapice et al. 2009, p. 2). There is ‘a manipulation of data culture’
in which international non-government organisations (INGOs) are advised not to publish
real data but to report figures as provided by government officials.2 Sometimes, key figures
released by the government are rejected by the international community as being clearly
inconsistent with other information – e.g. recent GDP figures for Myanmar were not
accepted by the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) (ESCAP 2007). Other
data are either not produced at all or theMyanmar government chooses not tomake it public.
Data cited by international agencies, no matter how many iterations removed, can frequently
be tracked back to official statistics (and perhaps to a parallel set of political incentives). We
would be smart to treat international agency statistics with equal caution to official sources.
(Save the Children – Myanmar and Desmond 2009, p. 2)
Inadequate and unreliable data are not unique to Myanmar; Feeny and Clarke (2009)
highlight similar issues in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands. Still,
Myanmar is the only member country of the Association of South East Asian Nations
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Table 1. Total population of Myanmar, as reported by various agencies (Adapted from Save the
Children – Myanmar and Desmond 2009).
Source Population (million) Year
ADB1 58.820 2008
ASEAN2 58.510 2008
DFAT (Aust)3 58.800 2008
EIU4 49.100 2008
IMF5 48.800 2008
MoFA6 52.400 2003
MoH7 56.620 2006
SDC8 48.400 2008
UN ESA9 50.519 2005
UNICEF10 48.798 2007
UN OHRLLS 11 42.720 2004
WHO12 48.379 2006
World Bank12 49.200 2008
Key:
1ADB: Key indicators for Asia & Pacific (2009).
2ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2008).
3Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Burma Factsheet (2009).
4Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report (May 2009).
5International Monetary Fund 2008.
6Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Nay Pyi Taw.
7Myanmar Ministry of Health. Health in Myanmar 2008, Nay Pyi Taw. Refers Planning Department, Ministry
of National Planning and Economic Development.
8SDC: Mekong Programme website (info from BBC).
9UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2007).
10UNICEF: At a Glance. Myanmar statistics (2008).
11UN OHRLLS Country Profiles. Special Report (2006).
13WHO World Health Statistics (2008).
14World Bank: World Development Indicators (2009).
(ASEAN) that has not yet begun to formulate a national statistical development strategy and
stands out as the country with the least capacity in ASEAN ‘to produce reliable and timely
data even for the most basic statistics’ (ESCAP 2007, p. 22). The World Bank’s Statistical
Capacity Indicator (2009) for Myanmar has been revised downward significantly over
the last three years (ESCAP 2007). The IMF regularly admonishes Myanmar to improve
data and statistical reporting (Collignon 2001), but this also suggests a responsibility on
the international community to work with the Myanmar government to help build data-
gathering and data integrity capacity.
2.2. Progress towards MDGs
This lack of reliable data makes any measure of humanitarian need and progress towards
MDGs difficult to accurately quantify. Nonetheless, the UNDP’s MDG Monitor database
(UNDP 2009) attempts to provide an overview of Myanmar’s current progress towards
achieving the MDGs based on the latest available data to the UN Statistics Division. The
official UN database monitoring MDG indicators (UN 2009) likewise provides data for
37 of 60 targets and indicators in Myanmar. These data in turn is primarily derived from
the Myanmar government figures, which are optimistic about the economy and country’s
progress towards achieving the MDGs within the constraints of the sanctions and non- or
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only partial involvement by key global donors and organisations (e.g. Soe Tha 2006, NLM
2009a, 2009b).
TheMyanmar government claims to be ‘taking all possiblemeasures’ and developing an
‘integrated and comprehensive strategies for action’, and that it has already achieved some
of the MDG targets despite the challenges of ongoing insurgencies, economic sanctions,
unfair international reputation and media stereotyping. The Myanmar government’s upbeat
economic assessment is questioned though. While the Myanmar government did produce
an MDG report in 2005 (GoUM 2005), it has not been released on the UN-ESCAP’s MDG
website (http://www.mdgasiapacific.org).
The UN indicators do suggest progress in a number of areas, but the issue of the
reliability of the data raises significant questions over the level of progress and there is
some difference in interpretation of data. The official MDG progress assessment by UNDP
and UN-ESCAP is reproduced in Table 2 and suggests that Myanmar is on track to meet
MDGs 2 and 3, and that MDGs 4, 6 and 7 may be possible if changes are made, with only
MDG 5 as being clearly off-track.
Feeny and Clarke’s (2008) assessment, in contrast, sees MDGs 2 and 4 as being off-
track but MDG 5 as being on-track. Given the UN MDG indicators (UN 2009) showing
under-5 child mortality as 103 per 1000, down only marginally and still the second highest
rate outside Africa (after Afghanistan), Feeny and Clarke’s (2008) analysis may be the
more accurate one. Either way, such wildly contradictory progress reports only highlight
the inadequacies of the data. ESCAP (2006) concedes that Myanmar is well off track in
achieving more than half of the high-priority indicators, while the European Commission’s
(EC) 2007 Strategy Paper on Myanmar concluded that:
While the lack of reliable data prevents an accurate assessment of Burma/Myanmar’s progress
towards achieving theMDGs, anecdotal evidence suggests that the country is severely off track
to achieve any of the MDGs by 2015. (2007, p. 9)
2.3. Humanitarian conditions
Most reports agree that at least half the population live at or below the poverty line
(Steinberg 2006, p. xxxvi), while one WHO figure estimates that the proportion of the
population living on less than US$1 a day may be as high as 90% (WHO 2008). Bradford’s
(2004) detailed analysis of the methodology used to estimate purchasing power parity (PPP)
for Myanmar finds flaws with the basic modelling and concurs that income per capita in
PPP terms is likely to be lower than what most estimates suggest and that the estimate that
50% of the population are below the US$1 a day poverty line may be too low an estimate.
Indeed, it is estimated that the average family spends 75% of its income on food (Myint-U
2009).
Myanmar suffers major deficiencies in most basic services. According to government
investment in education was just 0.3% of GDP in 1999–2000, ranking it amongst the lowest
in the world. Burma has the lowest per capita expenditure on health care in ASEAN (Vicary
2007); government figures show that the government spent just US$0.66 per capita on
public heath in 2006–2007 (see Table 3, in bold), which was almost double the amount
spent the year before and up substantially from previous years.
The EC quotes the Myanmar government figures that only 37% of households consume
a recommended daily requirement of calories and only 56% consume enough protein (2007,
p. 9). WHO reports a wide range of other significant health needs, including:
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Table 3. GDP, ODA (Official Development Assistance) and health expenditure for Myanmar and
reference countries.
2005 GDP per capita 2005 ODA per 2008 Govt. expenditure
(PPP US$) capita (US$) on health per capita
(UNDP 2007) (UNDP 2007) (US$) (WHO 2009)
Singapore 29,663 Donor 301
Thailand 8677 Net donor 63
Indonesia 3848 11.4 12
Vietnam 3071 23.0 10
Cambodia 2727 38.2 7
Laos 2039 49.9 4
Myanmar 1027 2.9 0.663
Sudan 2083 50.5 11
Zimbabwe 2038 28.3 9
Congo 1262 362.3 2
Ethiopia 1055 27.2 4
Note: Data in bold is the severity of the situation in Myanmar in bold.
• pregnancy-related deaths are the leading cause of mortality among women of reproduc-
tive age;
• malaria threatens 70% of the population and is the leading cause of morbidity and
mortality across the rest of the population;
• an estimated 1.6% of the population are infected with tuberculosis (TB) every year;
• nationwide 31.8% of children aged under five are moderately to severely underweight,
32.2% are stunted, and 8.6% are wasted; and,
• anaemia among pregnant women is put at 71%, and 75% among schoolchildren. (2008,
p. 1)
2.4. Restricted development assistance
While Myanmar is a poor country with significant humanitarian and economic needs, the
international concern that aid might flow to the military rulers or prolong military rule has
severely limited aid. A range of economic sanctions, some targeted and some more general,
were enacted after the military crackdown in Myanmar in 1988. These were progressively
strengthened after it became clear that power was not being transferred to Aung San Suu
Kyi and the democratically elected National League for Democracy, and in response to
ongoing human rights abuses. Figure 1 shows the major reduction in Official Development
Assistance (ODA) flows to Myanmar which accompanied these sanctions, first in 1988 and
then again after US and EU tightened sanctions in 1997. Reduced humanitarian aid has been
a direct consequence, reflecting the popular international perception that it is impossible
to conduct effective humanitarian work within such a political context, even to alleviate
extreme poverty. The unintended but clearly adverse humanitarian impact has been widely
published by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009) and others
(e.g. Hadar 1998, Ochlers 2004, Holiday 2005, Seekins 2005).
The broader economic sanctions policy, particularly bans on investment and a trade
embargo imposed by the US, is widely seen to have failed (Hadar 1998, Ochlers 2004,
Holiday 2005, Myint-U 2009). Such sanctions do not constitute pressure for change, ‘quite
the opposite, they strengthen the hand of those who are uninterested in further engagement
with the outside world and in particular the West’ (Myint-U 2009, p. 3). Holiday (2005)
argues that they are neither proportional nor have reasonable prospects of success. There
have been many calls to modify these sanctions (Dalpino 2009).
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Figure 1. Official development assistance (ODA in US$) to Myanmar 1960–2006. Source: Banki
(2009).
Pedersen (2009) notes that when these policies were put in place, many believed that
democracy was just around the corner and the dominant thought was that ‘aid could wait
a few years’ rather than risk delaying the primary goal of regime change. However, two
decades later, the people are further impoverished and the goal of democratisation seems
as elusive as ever. While acknowledging that the root causes of Myanmar’s development
failures are political, Pedersen (2009) argues that poverty has emerged as the most acutely
felt constraint on human rights for the majority of people across the country. He believes
that aid organisations are making a substantial difference, but ‘could do much more with
increased funding’, while the denial of foreign aid, investment and trade directly exacerbates
poverty and diminishes the ability of the general population to improve their livelihoods
(Pedersen 2008).
This is not an argument for the disbanding of targeted sanctions, but against the great
reluctance to provide humanitarian aid through UN agencies and INGOs even in a manner
that bypasses the regime to work directly with the people. The ICG notes that in 2006, the
averageODAflow to the 50UNLeastDevelopedCountries (LDCs)was 20 times the amount
Myanmar received per capita, and that other countries’ ‘similarly repressive governments’,
countries including Sudan, Zimbabwe and Laos, still receive 10 to 20 times more aid (ICG
2008, p. 15). Many development professionals working in Myanmar highlight the injustice
of this disparity. ODA to Myanmar in 2006 was the least of any LDC, at just US$2.90 per
capita (UNDP 2007, ICG 2008, p. 15).
3. Achieving the MDGs
3.1. Conflicting agendas
A broad range of positions have been taken in the literature regarding the relationship
between the MDGs and human rights, from suggestions the MDGs and human rights
are entirely consistent to arguments they are competing agendas. The UNDP’s Human
Development Report 2003 argues that the MDGs ‘reflect a human rights agenda – rights
to feed, education, health care and decent living standards’ (UNDP 2003, p. 29), while the
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UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) likewise suggests that
they ‘are interdependent and mutually reinforcing’ (OHCHR 2006, p. 8). The Australian
Council for International Development’s (ACFID’s) recentMillenniumDevelopment Rights
initiative suggests that the MDGs would be best met using a rights-based approach (RBA)
(ACFID 2009). However, Alston’s (2005) comprehensive review of the human rights and
MDG debate concludes that the MDGs only partially reflect the human rights agenda, and
while advocating a closer interaction between the two, speaks of a ‘limited convergence
between the agendas’.
A recent paper by Nelson draws out this contrast between an MDG-motivated approach
and the RBA, approaches he sees as conceptually fundamentally different:
The MDGs mobilize the classic development sector tools . . . The MDGs are a careful restate-
ment of poverty-related development challenges, in language that avoids reference to rights
. . . The RBA rests . . . on internationally recognized human rights standards and principles,
to which governments and donors are obliged to adhere . . . Rights-based approaches . . .
tie development to the rhetorical and legal power of internationally recognized human rights.
(2007, p. 2041)
The RBA revolves around enabling people to recognise their rights as enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, working to build their capacity to claim these
rights and working with duty-bearers – generally the state – to strengthen their capacity to
respond and be accountable in fulfilling these human rights (Nyamu-Musembi andCornwall
2004). The OHCHR speaks of the RBA as a conceptual framework that ‘seeks to analyse
inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory
practices and unjust distributions of power that impede development progress’ (2006, p.
15). TheOHCHR seeks for the RBA to be incorporated into theMDGs so that theGoalsmay
be underpinned with international law and will therefore be able to guarantee ‘a protected
space where the elite cannot monopolize development processes, policies and programmes’
(2006, p. 7). Most justifications for incorporating the RBA into the MDGs similarly stress
that rights make the MDGs explicitly political and put politics at the heart of development,
and that they provide a powerful normative framework as opposed to a utilitarian-driven
approach (Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004).
To Nelson (2007), this inherent difference between the RBA and the MDG-motivated
approach is expressed in fundamental differences in terms of the key agents mobilised and
policy recommendations. The MDGs were coined in terms that seek to make developing
countries’ governments, donors and UN agencies/NGOs all mutually accountable. If any-
thing, they are more donor centric in their formulation or are at least defined in terms of
mutual responsibility. They focus emphasis on issues created by poverty at the human and
community level, and on the need for international cooperation to alleviate this without any
inherent reference to cause or blame. The RBA approach, in contrast, focuses on national
governments as primary duty-bearers, seeks to empower populations to make substantive
claims against their governments and is couched in international legal terms.
It is this clash of development approaches and agendas that lies at the heart of the
issue in Myanmar. The RBA has been termed ‘empowerment through external pressure’
(Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004), and it is the politicisation of aid and the reactionary
reductions in humanitarian aid in response to human rights abuse allegations which we seek
to highlight, even aid delivered via INGOs and UN agencies. The Myanmar government is
far more open to a cooperative approach to alleviating extreme poverty in the country than
it is responsive to external pressure or attempts to use international law and agreements to
force change.
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Critical to the issue is that Western governments and agencies regularly couch their
most stinging rebukes of the Myanmar government and calls for regime change in human
rights language. Responding from a post-colonial perspective, and socialised to a view that
it is the armed forces (and its leaders) that have successfully held the Burmese post-colonial
state together, the Myanmar military leaders perceive threats to their leadership as threats to
the Burmese nation (Ni 2007, Pedersen 2008). The Burmese military intelligence believes
that the US interest in regime change in Myanmar is primarily related to its containment
policy towards China, particularly in relation to expanded Chinese influence in the Bay of
Bengal region, and that the US perceives Myanmar as the weakest link (Steinberg 2009).
The military leadership’s response to rights abuse allegations is therefore a deep suspicion
that these allegations are being exploited in a neo-colonial attempt to destabilise the state
and engineer regime change, rather than coming from genuine humanitarian concern, and
refuses to be recognised as a weak link. It also suggests that the Western preoccupation
with rights itself ends up in denying the Myanmar people these very same human rights
that they claim to protect by restricting aid and economic development, thereby trapping
people in poverty (e.g. NLM 2009b).
It is interesting that at the same time it rejects foreign pressure, the Myanmar military
leadership asks for greater assistance in alleviating extreme poverty and dealing with under-
development (e.g. Soe Tha 2006).
3.2. MDGs as second priority
This analysis highlights the conflicting agendas the international community has regarding
Myanmar. One agenda is poverty alleviation and development, informed by humanitarian
ideals and, today, an MDG approach. The other agenda believes that democratisation is a
pre-requisite to sustainable development, and therefore, believes that a long-term solution
to poverty in Myanmar is predicated on significant political change. The end goal might be
similar, but this latter approach is inspired in large part by rights-based thinking. Ideally,
the international community would like to see both agendas fulfilled, but the latter is the
dominant of these two agendas. The significant implication is an international community
prepared to restrict economic activity if necessary as a tool to push for democratisation
– if not outright removal of the regime – even at the expense of immediate humanitarian
assistance. This is reflected in sanctions, a stagnant economy (Turnell 2009) and extremely
low FDI (foreign direct investment) and ODA.
A direct consequence of this approach is the burden placed upon the achievement of
the MDGs. Restricted aid budgets highlight the fact that the West has effectively relegated
addressing extreme poverty and progress towards the MDGs to second priority, at least in
time order if not perceived importance.
This is not to say that the Myanmar government is prioritising poverty issues and
progress towards the MDGs either. The Myanmar government expresses a desire to bring
development and prosperity to the country, but sees both the current ethnic–political dis-
unity and the political pressure applied by theWest as jeopardising the stability and security
of the state. Based on centuries of history and its cultural political values, the Myanmar
government believes that national prosperity and development are dependent upon peace
and stability being established through ‘national reconsolidation’. It has therefore like-
wise relegated addressing poverty to second priority, dependent on prior stability and
state-building. This idea is expressed in its Four Political Objectives, slogans restated in
every edition of every newspaper. It is also reflected in common political slogans such as:
‘Only with stability and peace will the nation develop. Only with stability and peace will
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democratization process be successful [sic]’. TheMyanmar government sees these as funda-
mental obstacles to long-term significant poverty reduction and the international community
as not being constructive partners in addressing these state-building priorities.
TheMyanmar government sees stability and nation-building as pre-requisites to sustain-
able poverty alleviation, in the same manner as the West has relegated addressing poverty
to a second priority contingent on political change. These differing perspectives exacerbate
the impasse between the Myanmar government and the international community.
3.3. Requisites to achieve MDGs
The international community is in fairly broad agreement that achieving theMDGs globally
will require two things: (1) more and better targeted aid and, (2) commitments from the
developing countries to policy reform and better governance (e.g. ESCAP 2006). Baulch,
for example, argues that ‘substantially more aid – along with appropriate policies and
commitment in the developing countries – will be required to achieve the MDGs’ (2006,
p. 944) (also see World Bank 2009).
Policy reform and better governance are absolutely required in Myanmar. But the
experience of sanctions suggests that a confrontational RBA is not effective at achieving
these kinds of change in Myanmar, while the experience of international development
workers in the country argues that progress towards these aims is best achieved by building
relationships and through engagement, dialogue and cooperative projects.
Baulch (2006) highlights the need for donors to allocate aid based on the level of
poverty and the ability to make an impact ‘in accordance with the priorities set out by the
MDGs’, rather than on political considerations. Too often, aid is not given in response ‘to
the variables that make aid effective in reducing poverty . . . [but] is dictated as much by
political and strategic considerations as by the economic needs and policy performance of
the recipients’ (Alesina and Dollar 2000, p. 33).
Leaders of development organisations working in Myanmar agree that a focus on aid
conditionality as an approach to strengthening good governance only has had a limited
impact on the Myanmar government policy to date, while policy reform that has occurred
has come through active engagement and an approach that offers to explore current issues
together with officials in amore ‘no-blame’ fashion. Pedersen (2008) agrees that the greatest
promotion of human rights has occurred when the UN, governments, NGOs and private
corporations have maintained a ‘principled engagement’ with the Myanmar government,
as opposed to isolation and restriction even of humanitarian aid.
The need for significantly increased aid levels would seem to be particularly acute in
Myanmar, given the low level of a large number of indicators and particularly low current
aid flows. TheMyanmar government, when talking about its attempts to achieve theMDGs,
regularly asks for greater international assistance in terms of increased ODA and assistance
from the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank and so on (e.g. Soe Tha 2006, NLM
2009a, 2009b).
3.4. New research – key blockages in Myanmar
Western governments and major international donors maintain that ‘the necessary pre-
conditions for long-term development are not in place’ in Myanmar (Moore 2009), and this
is the reason behind heavily restricted aid flows. This reflects a view which believes that
without political reform, poverty reduction and development efforts are very limited in their
potential impact. Donor governments are also concerned about the Myanmar government’s
expenditure on the military and the hiding of billions of dollars of profit from natural gas
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exports via artificial exchange rates 150–200 times below the market rate (Turnell 2007).
Some donor governments believe that the senior generals are diverting funds into personal
bank accounts and thus ask, ‘Why should we put more in when they don’t?’4
However, many leaders of international aid and development organisations have a
significantly different view.
While sharing concerns about the current military regime, the interviewed development
professionals working in Myanmar contend that the current aid is effective.5 They see
injustice inherent in the low ODA levels Myanmar receives as compared with other poor
countries that lack democratic institutions and have poor human rights records, and argue
that sanctions, low aid funding, restricted mandates and the absence of key institutions such
as the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank are more immediate blockages to
current efforts to alleviate extreme poverty than domestic governance and policy issues.
While they agree that the fundamental issues behind poverty in Myanmar stem from
domestic political history, they refer to a long period of political history and are frustrated
that the poor continue to suffer because false stereotypical perceptions restrict aid mandates
and funding.
Constructive relationships with cooperative officials, these development profession-
als believe, are allowing an enormous amount more to be achieved in Myanmar than is
currently acknowledged: ‘Myanmar has in the past rarely received any positive press or
commendation for work done well, despite a considerable amount of progress that takes
place’ (Allan 2009, p. 1).
A similar interview research by Igboemeka (2005, p. 2) of representatives of UN
agencies, INGOs and donors working in Myanmar agrees. She likewise found a consensus
amongst agencies that aid was being effective in addressing extreme poverty, and that the
most significant constraints to increased aid effectiveness are not predominantly related
to government restrictions but ‘the highly politicized context, the highly restricted space
for assistance, an atmosphere of secrecy and self-censorship, limited financial and human
resources, and the lack of reliable data’ (2005).
The high-level panel at the 2009 Burma/Myanmar: Views from the Ground and the
International Community symposium hosted in Washington DC by the National Bureau of
Asian Research further affirmed both that humanitarian aid to Myanmar is being effective
and that Myanmar has the capacity to effectively absorb additional aid without diversion
(Chee 2009, Dalpino 2009, Horsey 2009, Kirkwood 2009, Pedersen 2009). In addition,
Assistant US Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell has likewise acknowledged that US aid
after CycloneNargiswas effective (Campbell 2009), and respected scholarsDavid Steinberg
and Thant Myint-U argued at the same US Senate hearing that the humanitarian situation
is getting worse, that aid is being effective in Myanmar, that Myanmar has the capacity to
effectively absorb additional aid and that, therefore, other agendas should be put aside and
humanitarian assistance increased (Myint-U 2009, Steinberg 2009).
This collective voice suggests that the MDGs are far from irrelevant in Myanmar, and
that the potential for progress towards a range of MDG indicators is possible even within
the current context, but calls loudly for additional funding to help make that a priority.
4. Tailoring the MDGs – a way forward?
4.1. Intent of the MDGs
Moving beyond the call for increased aid to help achieve the MDGs in Myanmar, develop-
ment cooperation with the Myanmar government towards achieving MDGs tailored to the
specific context would appear to be the most fruitful way forward.
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As one of the original architects of the MDGs, Vandermoortele (2011) is adamant
that our current preoccupation with measuring each country’s progress against each of the
goals, targets and indicators is a misuse of the MDG concept. The MDGs were originally
constructed as global goals, intended to be global averages with the overall aim of eradi-
cating extreme poverty as rapidly as possible. The MDG targets were set by extrapolating
global rates of progress and were therefore built on assumptions that it was realistic to
expect to maintain global average rates of progress. Vandermoortele (2011) strongly ad-
vocates tailoring the MDGs to the specific context of each country and would like to see
the global MDGs inform but not dictate local goals. Progress towards the overall global
goals should only be measured on a global average basis, and individual countries should
only be measured in terms of progress towards their tailored goals. This implies the possi-
bility of two sets of data, one to compile global averages and another to measure national
progress.
It has already been noted that so long as we continue to uphold the idea of uniform
MDG targets across the globe, we risk major problems stemming from perceived failure
in 2015. It is very likely that the governments of countries not achieving MDG targets,
together with international aid donors, will be heavily criticised for a lack of action. This
is likely to further weaken the support for aid and undermine any important reforms being
undertaken by developing countries (Clemens et al. 2007).
In the case of Myanmar, we would still hope that significant reform and progress would
be possible before 2015, and avoiding this sort of a setback should attract significant atten-
tion. In countries such as Myanmar, where it is clear that some or all of the MDGs cannot
be met, donors should support national governments in tailoring their goals. Development
goals are important, and rather than abandoning the MDGs, the answer lies in tailoring
them to specific country contexts (see Feeny and Clarke 2008, 2009). What matters is the
existence of appropriate, mutually agreed upon targets that governments and the interna-
tional community can work towards. This will lead to greater action to achieve them. Such
goals should reflect countries’ individual situations and development constraints.
4.2. Tailoring the MDGs to Myanmar
It has already been argued that tailored goals and targets should be developed by the
governments of developing countries themselves, with strong international assistance and
support, and incorporated into their national development strategies. The UNDP was an
active adviserworkingwith national departments in the examples describedVandermoortele
(2011), and our first recommendation is that the UNDPmandate be expanded to allow them
to work with the Myanmar government to attempt facilitating a similar process.
In an attempt to begin this discussion, I would like to submit some thoughts regarding
possible starting points for tailored MDGs for consideration by the Myanmar government,
UNDP, UN agencies and the broader international community.
The following point the way to tailoredMDGs forMyanmar, based on the above tailored
examples:
(1) MDG 1 Target 1 – Revised more realistic goal:
Following the lead of PNG (see Feeny and Clarke 2009), Myanmar might be better
if it revises MDG 1 Target 1 to decrease the proportion of people living on less
than $1 a day to (say) a 15% reduction by 2015, and a 50% reduction by 2020 or
2025. Adjusting the target and time frame in this manner may be more realistic in
spurring greater action to achieve it.
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(2) MDGs 2, 4 and 5 – Education and health goals:
After income poverty (MDG 1), the worst performing indicators in Myanmar are
in the area of health, with education being next. We recommend that a partnership
agreement (as per MDG 8) be explored which would see both international donors
and the Myanmar government commit to matched increases in funding for health
and education. This proposal would involve a reversal of current policy to enable
working with and through the national government, potentially even evolving into
budgetary support, but (for now) restricted to addressing high-priority health and
education goals.
To remove the risk of fungibility and to add incentive, the international com-
munity should condition its commitment on matching, say dollar for dollar, on
demonstrated government increases in expenditure in these areas. We would an-
ticipate that the Myanmar government goal commitment be best expressed as a
percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) or some such measure, and that rev-
enue from the new natural gas pipelines be considered as the source of the required
additional revenue.
(3) MDG 8 – Partnerships for development:
(a) Specific goals for increased aid flows should be clearly espoused. The INGO
community in Myanmar recently expressed its view via an open letter that
the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) budget for
Myanmar should rise to US$60 million by 2012, arguing that humanitarian
aid has a proven track record in Myanmar of effectively reducing poverty,
encouraging policy change and providing space for civil society to grow (INGO
Community 2009). A clear global goal should be expressed by the international
community, which might be, say, a 100% increase in current ODA toMyanmar
by 2015. This aid need not be via the Myanmar government, as it has already
been demonstrated that there remains a large absorptive capacity of aid being
delivered by UN agencies and INGOs operating in the country.
(b) ESCAP/ADB/UNDP reports speak about the need for capacity building of na-
tional governments and institutions by international partners if MDGs are to be
achieved (2008, p. 6). Capacity building of institutions and departments, with
sanctions adjusted to allow for relevant projects, could provide the opportunity
for significant building of trust and goodwill in constructive engagement on
the issue of poverty alleviation. As one INGO country director expressed:
No matter who’s in charge of the country in the future, the same group of civil
servants are going to provide these services, so up-skilling and resourcing them
is not necessarily putting money into the hands of restricted people. And by
strengthening their hand it strengthens their ability to do a lot of good things that
they want to be doing, and I think this is where there’s not a clear understanding
in some agencies of the fact that you do have this divide between the civil service
sector and the governing sector.6
Given that income poverty, and child and maternal health are the global
MDGs showing the lowest indicators in Myanmar, additional partnership
around these goals should be explored. These could therefore be the target
of deliberate capacity-building and trust-building joint projects with specific
officials, particularly at the township officer level, as well as the focus of further
capacity-building partnerships with emerging civil society.
(c) The US has supported programmes designed to improve justice and the rule
of law in a variety of authoritarian states (Steinberg 2009). Australia likewise
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has previously conducted human rights training in Myanmar, as it also did in
Indonesia under Suharto. Steinberg (2009)’s goals surrounding cooperation in
some sort of counter-terrorism, human rights and rule of law training may also
be relevant.
(d) At the same time, the international community should clearly spell out criteria
for the removal of the more general economic sanctions that restrict broader
economic growth, particularly those relating to FDI, import–export trade and
international bank transfers.
(4) Data – An additional MDG:
Effective poverty alleviation and nation-wide community development initiatives
are contingent on reliable data being widely available. A first recommendation
is for a new goal, i.e., to improve the statistical data collection capacity of the
government and the willingness and ability to disseminate results. This has been
widely called for over many years, and the coordination efforts post-Nargis have
improved the situation somewhat in some areas of the country. However, widely
available baseline data are still lacking for much of the country and is foundational
to addressing all the MDGs.
In particular, a tailored goal on date could include planning for a national
census before 2015, which establishes a comprehensive and accurate baseline of
data for a range of information, from population to key MDG indicators. The goal
should also include achieving a level of trust and relationship between theMyanmar
government and the international community such that widespread dissemination
is possible without fear of recrimination or politicisation.
(5) Roadmap to democracy – An additional MDG:
Myanmar embarked on its seven-step Roadmap to Democracy in 2003. While
widely criticised, potentially the elections in 2010 and the existence of this Roadmap
constitute a starting point for discussion of the 2015 MDGs.
The big challenge in tailoringMDGs like this is to build a relationship of sufficient trust
between the international community and the Myanmar government to make progress in
negotiations and towards achieving the goals – and to ensure adequate funding flows from
national donors and that all parties have sufficient commitment to achieving the goals.
5. Conclusion
The political context surrounding Myanmar is complex. An unintended but direct con-
sequence of the international sanctions against Myanmar is reduced aid flows, resulting
in slow progress towards eliminating extreme poverty. Myanmar is currently unlikely to
achieve many of the global MDG targets by 2015, but given the international momentum
the MDGmovement has created, the potential setback to donor funding and to political and
policy reform should Myanmar be seen to ‘miss’ the MDG targets is great. It is likely that
governments not achieving the MDGs, together with international donors, will be heavily
criticised for a lack of action. Such an outcome is likely to undermine progress in Myanmar
and should be avoided at all costs.
However, the MDGs are not irrelevant in Myanmar. Restricted aid budgets are one of
the greatest limiting factors in poverty alleviation in the country. It has been thoroughly
documented that current humanitarian aid to Myanmar through UN agencies and INGOs is
effective in addressing extreme poverty, and that there exists additional absorptive capacity
even without change in policies or the abolition of sanctions. Aid levels should therefore be
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urgently reviewed, towards renewed effort to achieving the realistic contributions towards
the global MDGs in Myanmar.
While the goal of human rights remains, our language surrounding development in
Myanmar and in negotiation with the military regime should reflect a utilitarian and cooper-
ativeMDG-motivated approach.While there is no guarantee of a better relationship with the
Myanmar government if humanitarian engagement is extended, evidence does show that aid
has been effective inMyanmar in reducing extreme poverty, producing policy reform and fa-
cilitating growth of civil society.Many aid agencies have also built some of the best relation-
ships with regime officials. Long-term poverty alleviation inMyanmar requires not just pol-
icy and governance reform in the domestic political arena, but also a restoration of trust and
a sense of partnership between the Myanmar government and the international community.
A process should be instituted to tailor the MDGs to the local Myanmar context to
create the greatest buy-in and motivation by all parties. This paper urges for the UNDP
to be empowered to facilitate discussions and consideration by the Myanmar government
towards tailoredMDGs that are both attainable and progressive. Such tailored goals must be
primarily developed and owned by the Myanmar government, but a few recommendations
of the shape these may take have been included in the paper. Attention should be focussed
on the issue of extreme poverty in the country, but could also include accurate baseline
data, democratisation and development cooperation in a range of capacities.
Notes
1. In 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) changed the official English-
language name of the country from ‘The Union of Burma’ to ‘The Union of Myanmar’. The
UN and ASEAN have accepted the name change, the EU, including the UK, adopted the clumsy
Burma/Myanmar, and Australia and the USA (amongst others) reject the change, in solidarity
with Aung San Suu Kyi. For many, either choice of the name is political. This paper would
prefer an apolitical position, but adopts the name Myanmar out of pragmatic consideration for
the agencies working inside the country.
2. Personal interview with the country director of a major INGO, Yangon, July 2009 (anonymous
at the request of the interviewee).
3. WHO (2009) simply lists this figure as <US$1. This $0.66 figure is from the Ministry of
Health report Health in Myanmar 2008 (MoH 2008, p. 8) for 2006–2007 expenditure, converted
from Kyat into US dollars at the unofficial exchange rate as quoted by The Irrawaddy (http://
www.irrawaddy.org) for February 2007. Vicary (2007) puts the figure at $0.09.
4. Personal interview, Yangon, June 2009 (anonymous at the request of interviewee).
5. These viewswere expressed during a series of 47 structured, qualitative interviews of development
professionals working within Myanmar by the first author of this paper in 2009. The interviews
were used to investigate the adaptations international development organisations make to their
operations and projects in order to achieve effectiveness in Myanmar. While this research is being
published (Ware 2010, 2011), these key leaders of international organisations almost uniformly
see that the greatest constraints on humanitarian work in Myanmar today are not restrictions
coming from the Myanmar government but from the international environment of low aid flows
and sanctions in which the country is forced to operate.
6. Personal interview with Dr Mike Griffiths, The Leprosy Mission International, Yangon, June
2009.
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